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Abstract
This paper implements a simultaneous equations model to test for international financial
contagion among developed sovereign credit markets between May 1, 2000 and September
1, 2010. Two alternative measures are proposed that identify credit crises in the tails of
bond yield distributions, which are derived from Extreme Value Theory and Value-at-Risk
analysis. The findings show that the large-scale fluctuations in long term sovereign bond
yields observed during episodes of financial distress signal a structural shift in cross-market
linkages with respect to tranquil periods. All analyzed countries are vulnerable to shift-
contagion and the estimated contagion effects are robust across the different measures of
credit crises. The empirical results convey the policy implication that a new sovereign
debt management mechanism ought to incorporate the risk of financial contagion, as it
carries adverse effects on the overall financing constraints in the economy.
JEL classification: C32; G15
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1. Introduction
Developed capital markets have been hit by several waves of financial distress since the
outbreak of the global credit crisis in mid-2007. The most recent of these episodes appears
to be the turmoil in the European sovereign debt market in spring 2010. The events were
triggered by mounting concerns over the fiscal sustainability of the Mediterranean region,
which swiftly translated into a surge of government bond yields and an en masse flight-
to-quality. Prompted by financial market pressures, the governments of Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, and Spain have already announced or taken policy measures in order to correct
their large imbalances. Nevertheless, since fiscal austerity requires enduring commitments,
the future of sovereign debt management remains at the heart of an international policy
debate.
In this paper, we investigate whether the recently experienced large-scale fluctuations
in sovereign bond yields signal a structural shift in cross-market linkages with respect to
tranquil periods. Movements in sovereign bond yields affect the entire risk structure of
interest rates, since corporate bonds are priced with a risk premium over benchmark bonds
of the same maturity. Hence, spillovers across sovereign credit markets affect government
fiscal balances directly, and also convey backlash effects on the fund raising capacity of
the corporate sector. Quantifying the exposure of developed countries to such spillovers
can help policymakers gain insight into the overall financing constraints, as well as the
external risks faced by the economy.
The transmission of financial difficulties from one country to others - across regions and
asset classes - characterized the majority of recent large-scale financial crises, including
the 1987 U.S. stock market crash, the 1992-1993 exchange rate crisis of the ERM, the 1994
Mexican ’tequila’ crisis, the 1997 Asian ’flu’, the 1998 Russian bond crisis, the 2001 U.S.
’dot-com’ crisis, and the 2007 subprime crisis. Financial shocks are propagated across
countries through various transmission channels. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) and
Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) find that financial channels, such as a common bank
creditor and cross-market risk hedging are the significant conduits of crises, while Glick
and Rose (1999) identify international trade as a potential transmission channel. The
strength of trade and financial channels can be exacerbated by institutional links (Allen
and Gale, 2000), international portfolio rebalancing (Kodres and Pritsker, 2002), links
across multiple asset classes (Pavlova and Rigobon, 2007), or the fragility of the banking
sector during a crisis (Bruinshoofd et al., 2010).
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) draw a conceptual distinction between the inter-
national transmission of financial crises through fundamentals-based channels (finance,
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trade, etc.), and ’true’ contagion, which arises when all channels of potential interconnec-
tion have been controlled for. True contagion is commonly associated with (rational or
irrational) investor behavior, such as herding under limited information, index tracking,
or bandwagon effects. There is a large body of literature that investigates financial con-
tagion, exhaustive surveys are offered by Claessens and Forbes (2001) and Pericoli and
Sbracia (2003). Early contagion studies typically assess changes in cross-correlation coeffi-
cients of stock market returns and they interpret a significant increase in cross-correlation
after a crisis as evidence for contagion. For instance, in a seminal work, King and Wad-
hwani (1990) argue that the significant increase in cross-correlations between the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Japanese stock markets in the aftermath of the 1987
U.S. market crash was due to contagion. However, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) prove
that the tests based on conditional cross-correlation are biased upwards in the presence of
heteroskedasticity. Once they control for the bias, they find little evidence for contagion,
only cross-market dependence.
Indeed, the last few decades have witnessed a worldwide capital market integration,
leading to global interdependence between financial markets. Therefore, the strong cross-
country links observed after crises might not be significantly different from those during
calm periods. Consequently, Forbes and Rigobon (2001, 2002) distinguish between conta-
gion and interdependence, and introduce the concept of shift-contagion, which is defined
as ”a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to an individual country
(or group of countries)” (Forbes and Rigobon, 2001, pp. 13). In this paper, we adopt
their definition, as it constitutes a widespread consensus in the literature. Therefore, we
do not intend to identify the transmission channel, instead we test for a change in bond
yields due to a shift in the transmission mechanism during crisis periods.
A battery of statistical methods have been applied to investigate shift-contagion, a
comprehensive review is provided in Dungey et al. (2005). A partial list of methods
includes the adjusted correlation test of Forbes and Rigobon (2002), the VAR model of
Favero and Giavazzi (2002), the discrete choice models of Eichengreen et al. (1996), and
Bae et al. (2003), the coexceedance approach of Hartmann et al. (2004), the common
factor models of Corsetti et al. (2005), Bekaert et al. (2005), and Dungey and Martin
(2007), the common features test of Candelon et al. (2005), and the copula approach of
Rodriguez (2007) and Candelon and Manner (2010). While all of these papers account
for strong interdependence, the evidence for shift-contagion appears to be mixed. Never-
theless, most of them agree that shift-contagion has played a role in the propagation of
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financial shocks during the crises listed above.3
Recently, Pesaran and Pick (2007) have proposed a canonical model which delivers a
synthesis of the most imminent econometric issues in the analysis of shift-contagion. The
model identifies the contagion effects in the presence of observed financial market interde-
pendence, as well as unobserved cross-sectional dependence between the model residuals.
We employ a heteroskedasticity robust version of this canonical model to investigate the
cross-country linkages among developed sovereign bond markets, and we propose two
credit crisis indicators that are derived from Extreme Value Theory and Value-at-Risk
methods. The model is estimated on a sample of long-maturity government bond yields
of 18 advanced economies.
The main economic contribution of this paper is to provide statistical evidence that
developed countries are subject to a severe risk of contagion whenever a credit crisis is
unfolding in another country or a group of countries. In summary, we find that all analyzed
countries are vulnerable to shift-contagion and the estimated contagion effects are robust
to the different measures of credit crises. Furthermore, the results are robust to a series
of diagnostic tests of the model. Our findings convey considerable policy implications in
terms of European and global sovereign debt management. The central message is that,
at times of stress, governments need to act in concert in order to reassure the markets of
their commitment to a balanced fiscal path. Therefore, strong efforts in the supranational
coordination of debt policies may be inevitable, of which the first signs are already visible
in Europe.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we formulate the canonical
contagion model. Subsequently, the identification strategy of sovereign credit events is
described. Section 3 presents the empirical results on contagion among the sovereign bond
yields and we provide evidence for the robustness of our findings. Finally, section 4 offers
conclusions.
3A related strand of the literature investigates international volatility spillovers, for example, Engle
et al. (1990), Cheung and Ng (1996), or more recently Diebold and Yilmaz (2009). The typical finding is
that financial market volatility can be described as ”a meteor shower which rains down on the earth as
it turns.” (Engle et al., 1990, pp. 526). While traditional ARCH and GARCH studies do not explicitly
test for a shift in the cross-market volatility linkages, Baele (2005) and Gallo and Otranto (2008) have
overcome this deficiency, using nonlinear models. Even though this line of research can offer valuable
information for portfolio risk managers, we restrain ourselves to modelling shift-contagion in the first
moment of returns, as this approach has been more closely associated with the concept of shift-contagion
in the literature.
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2. Econometric Methodology
The econometric analysis of contagion generally requires the specification of dynamic
multivariate models. Even though there is no scientific consensus on the precise method-
ology, the formulated model needs to satisfy certain conditions in order to achieve iden-
tification of the contagion effects. We briefly review these conditions.
First, in integrated financial markets, equity portfolios are allocated across geographic
borders and regions. Consequently, markets are tied together by common factors that
are either observed to the econometrician, or latent. These factors give rise to cross-
sectional dependence among the time series because they serve as natural conduits to
global financial and macroeconomic shocks (for example, commodity price, productivity,
or preference shocks, terms-of-trade shocks, or changes in global discount factors). If
a model of contagion fails to account for observed as well as unobserved cross-sectional
dependence, this could lead to the inconsistent estimation of the contagion effects (see
Corsetti et al., 2005 and Pesaran and Pick, 2007 for a detailed discussion). To address
this issue, Corsetti et al. (2005), Bekaert et al. (2005), and Dungey and Martin (2007)
propose common factor models, in which shift-contagion is captured by the cross-market
transmission of an idiosyncratic shock to a particular market. These papers find significant
evidence for cross-sectional dependence, as well as shift-contagion in the Asian, European
and Latin American region during crises. However, since these models require an ad hoc
classification of crisis and non-crisis periods, their results are subject to a sample selection
bias.
A second consideration concerns that in contrast to the fundamentals-based channels
of interdependence which operate at all times, shift-contagion can be viewed as a crisis-
contingent transmission mechanism. Thus, during a crisis, it introduces a transitory shift
in the process that generates equity returns. At the level of economic theory, such a
shift may be associated, for example, with a jump between multiple equilibria due to
self-fulfilling expectations (see Masson, 1999), or cross-border portfolio rebalancing under
limited information (see Kodres and Pritsker, 2002). This issue suggests the necessity to
incorporate nonlinearities in the contagion model. To this end, Bae et al. (2003) and
Hartmann et al. (2004) focus on tail correlations in extremal returns, Rodriguez (2007)
and Candelon and Manner (2010) employ time-varying copulas, while Ang and Bekaert
(2002), Baele (2005), and Gallo and Otranto (2008) formulate time series models with
regime-switching dynamics. Nevetheless, in these frameworks it is cumbersome to model
latent interdependence. Moreover, regime-switching autoregressions typically overlook
the possibility that the transition between regimes in one market may depend on the
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other markets and vice versa.4
Pesaran and Pick (2007) offer a methodological synthesis of these econometric issues
in a canonical model of contagion. Their method is closely related to Dungey et al.
(2005) and Favero and Giavazzi (2002). In particular, Dungey et al. (2005) propose a
multivariate version of the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) test for shift-contagion, and they
show that this test can be cast as a Chow structural break test using dummy variables. In a
similar framework, Favero and Giavazzi (2002) estimate a structural model with exogenous
dummy variables. The main difference between the canonical model of Pesaran and Pick
(2007) and the latter approaches is that the crisis dummies are treated as endogenous.
Specifically, they formulate a nonlinear simultaneous equations model with endogenous
threshold variables accounting for the crisis periods. This canonical model controls for
observed common and country-specific factors, as well as for unobserved interdependence.
It turns out that if the residuals are cross-sectionally dependent, country-specific regressors
are in fact necessary for the identification and consistent estimation of the contagion
coefficients.
The residuals in the Pesaran-Pick model are assumed to be homoskedastic, although
an increase in volatility in the source country during crisis periods distorts the estimated
cross-country financial linkages (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2002), and the unconditional
density of financial returns typically exhibits an extremal feature (see Hols and de Vries,
1991). Therefore, we augment the canonical model with two alternative measures of credit
crises. We propose a new crisis indicator which is a function of market volatility, and
another crisis indicator that exploits the extremal feature of financial returns. Although
the estimated contagion effects are remarkably robust across these crisis measures, we
favor the volatility-based indicator because it is less subject to sample dependence. The
canonical model of contagion is discussed in what follows.
2.1. The Canonical Model of Contagion
Let yt = (y1t, ..., yNt)
′
denote a finite realization of the N -dimensional vector process
{yt}, where yit are the changes in sovereign bond yields for country i = 1, ..., N observed
over t = 1, ..., T periods (i ∈ N; t ∈ Z). The canonical contagion model for country i is
defined as:
yit = δ
′
igt + α
′
isit + β
+
i C
+
it + β
−
i C
−
it + uit, (1)
4Note, that as a side outcome, regime-shifts present a natural way to overcome the sample selection
problem posed by ad hoc crisis classifications.
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where gt is a (G×1) vector of global factors that capture observed financial market inter-
dependence (E(gt|uit) = 0); sit is a (S × 1) vector of observed country-specific regressors
which may include lagged values of yit (E(sit|uit) = 0); and Cit = (C
+
it , C
−
it ) is a credit
event indicator which takes the value of unity during a credit event (or crisis), and it is
zero otherwise (E(Cit|uit) 6= 0). The residuals, uit, are distributed conditional on the t−1
information set Ft−1 as uit|Ft−1 ∼ N(0, σ
2
it). Finally, the unobserved interdependence
across countries, which prevails under normal market conditions, is captured by the non-
zero contemporaneous correlation coefficient Corr(uit, ujt) = ρij for all i, j = 1, ...., N and
i 6= j.5
The model does not require an ad hoc classification of the observations into crisis
and non-crisis periods, the indicator Cit is instead derived from the statistical properties
of the data. In particular, we consider credit events to be extreme events in the upper
and lower tail of bond yield distributions. In case of sovereign entities, a credit event is
usually defined de jure as an obligation acceleration, moratorium, or restructuring, which
we may coin soft forms of default. However, Sy (2004) argues that a definition of sovereign
debt crises which relies exclusively on the latter has become obsolete with the emergence
of sovereign bond markets in the 1990s. A more accurate definition of debt-servicing
difficulties can be obtained in terms of distress in the sovereign bond market, which is
said to occur if government bond yields exceed a critical threshold that corresponds to an
extreme credit event.
A formulation of the indicator Cit that accounts for extreme bond market dynamics,
and which is the most consistent with the conventional definition of a financial crisis in
the literature (see, for example, Eichengreen et al., 1996, and Pesaran and Pick, 2007) is
given by:
C1+it = I
(∑N
j=1,j 6=i I(yjt − τj > 0)
)
, and C1−it = I
(∑N
j=1,j 6=i I(−yjt − τj > 0)
)
, (2)
where I(.) is an indicator function, and τj is a threshold value (where τj ∈ Ft−1). If
|yjt| rises above this threshold, then a credit event is said to occur in country j. This
crisis indicator accumulates the crisis observations across countries. Thus, under this
formulation, whenever at least one of the N − 1 remaining countries is in crisis, the
5With known threshold values the model in eq. (1) is a system of N simultaneous equations that is
nonlinear in the endogenous variables (yjt) and linear in the parameters. The primary objective of this
paper is the estimation of contagion in international bond markets within this framework. Hence, for
the mathematical solution of this system and the possibility of multiple equilibria we refer the reader to
Pesaran and Pick (2007), who offer a detailed theoretical exposition of these issues.
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turmoil in that credit market (or markets) can potentially spill over to country i.
We also consider the following indicator:
C2+it = I
(
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
I(yjt − τjt(σ
2
jt) > 0)
)
, (3)
and
C2−it = I
(
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
I(−yjt − τjt(σ
2
jt) > 0)
)
, (4)
which makes the threshold of the jth market a function of the time-varying volatility (σ2jt)
of this market.
The indicators C1+it and C
2+
it correspond to an excessive increase, while C
1−
it and C
2−
it
to an excessive drop in the rate of change of bond yields. Hence, C1+it or C
2+
it type credit
events signal upside risks, while C1−it or C
2−
it represent downside risks associated with the
underlying bonds. Therefore, we denote them as ’upside-risk’ events, and ’downside-risk’
events, respectively. Nevertheless, since financial returns typically exhibit persistence in
second moments (volatility clustering), the two phenomena are essentially the two sides
of the same coin.
In this canonical framework, if the conditions for the identification of the contagion
coefficients are met, a test for shift-contagion in country i entails a t-test for the null
hypotheses β+i = 0 and β
−
i = 0, against the one-sided alternatives, β
+
i > 0 and β
−
i < 0,
respectively.
2.2. Identification and Estimation of the Model
Let θi = (δ
′
i, α
′
i, β
+
i , β
−
i )
′
denote the vector of parameters. Pesaran and Pick (2007)
demonstrate that without imposing further restrictions on the model, the OLS estimator
is inconsistent due to the endogeneity of the crisis indicator Cit. Furthermore, absent
country-specific regressors (that is, if αi = 0) the contagion coefficients (β
+
i and β
−
i ) are
not identified. An additional complication is implied by the cross-sectional dependence
in the errors. It can be shown that applying, for example, the common correlated effects
estimator of Pesaran (2006), which is robust to cross-sectional error-dependence, leads to
unidentified contagion coefficients. However, if there are regressors specific to country i
that are correlated with Cit and uncorrelated with uit, then the contagion coefficients can
be consistently estimated by single-equation instrumental variable methods.
Define the vectors yi = (yi1, ..., yiT )’, xit = (g
′
t, s
′
it, C
′
it)
′
, and the matrix Xi = (x
′
i1,...,
x
′
iT )’. Further, let Zi = (z
′
i1, ..., z
′
iT )’ represent the matrix of instruments. Pesaran and
Pick (2007) apply the following single-equation two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator:
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θˆ2SLSi = (X
′
iZiWiZ
′
iXi)
−1X
′
iZiWiZ
′
iyi, (5)
where, with i.i.d. residuals, the optimal weighting matrix is Wi = (Z
′
iZi)
−1. However, if
the errors are heteroskedastic or exhibit autocorrelation, then the weighting matrix must
be adjusted as WˆH2SLSi = (T
−1
∑T
t=1 z
′
ituˆituˆ
′
itzit)
−1, where uˆit is the residual obtained
from the initial consistent estimator in eq. (5), that is, uˆit = yit−xit θˆ
2SLS
i . Substituting
this weighting matrix into eq. (5), one obtains the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent (HAC) two-stage least squares (H2SLS) estimator:
θˆH2SLSi = (X
′
iZiWˆ
H2SLS
i Z
′
iXi)
−1X
′
iZiWˆ
H2SLS
i Z
′
iyi. (6)
The variance of the latter is estimated as:
Vˆ (θˆH2SLSi ) =

X′iZi
(
T∑
t=1
z
′
it
ˆˆuit ˆˆu
′
itzit
)−1
Z
′
iXi


−1
, (7)
where ˆˆuit = yit − xit θˆ
H2SLS
i . The asymptotic standard errors are obtained as the square
roots of the diagonal elements of Vˆ (θˆH2SLSi ), and standard inference applies.
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We use market-specific regressors of the remaining N − 1 markets, including lagged
dependent variables, to instrument the endogenous credit crisis indicator, Cit. Kelejian
(1971) suggests that since Cit is a nonlinear function, its approximation can be improved
by using a polynomial of degree d in the instruments. Therefore, we consider the following
vector of instruments:
zit =
(
s
′
jt, (s
2
jt)
′
, ..., (sdjt)
′
)′
. (8)
Three features of the model defined in eq. (1) require special attention, as pointed
out by Pick (2007) and Dungey et al. (2006). First, the model is incoherent, that is,
for certain values of the exogenous regressors and the error term the joint p.d.f. of the
dependent variables conditional on the exogenous variables does not integrate to unity
(in other words, there is no unique mapping from the right-hand-side variables to the
left-hand-side variable). This problem does not affect the identification of the parameters
of interest, however, it may affect efficiency. Second, the threshold parameter in the
indicator function is not identified under the null of no contagion. Third, the model is
subject to a problem of weak instruments, as shown by Dungey et al. (2006). These
6For a more detailed discussion see Wooldridge (2002), Section 8.3.
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issues have been addressed by Pick (2007) via Monte Carlo simulations. He finds, that
the effect of incoherence on efficiency is small. Furthermore, exploring different k-class
estimators and various methods to choose an optimal instrument set, he concludes that
the above described 2SLS estimator with using all possible instruments performs best
in terms of empirical size and power. Therefore, we use the H2SLS estimator with all
available instruments up to d = 6 in our empirical analysis.
2.3. Identification of Credit Events
The choice of the threshold τj is crucial for the consistent dating of a credit event,
since the faulty identification of crises can result in loss of power, as shown by Dungey et
al. (2006). However, the change in bond yields that signals a credit crisis is in general
ambiguous.7 Considering a credit crisis as an extreme event in the sovereign bond market,
we compute an unconditional large quantile estimator of τj derived from Extreme Value
Theory, and a conditional quantile estimator of τjt(σ
2
jt) applying Value-at-Risk analysis.
2.3.1. The Extreme Value Theory Threshold
The unconditional p.d.f. of financial returns typically exhibits a heavy tail feature.
Extreme Value Theory (EVT) provides an approximation of the asymptotic distribution
of extreme returns via the estimation of an extreme-value (or tail) index, α, or its inverse,
γ = 1/α, which represents the degree of probability mass in the tail. Subsequently, the
corresponding large quantile can be computed, and this indicates the limit value beyond
which a return becomes extreme. EVT has been extensively applied in the analysis of
financial returns. For example, Hols and de Vries (1991), Danielsson and de Vries (1997),
or more recently Candelon and Straetmans (2006) study extreme exchange rate volatility,
whereas Bae et al. (2003), and Hartmann et al. (2004) use EVT to investigate financial
crises and contagion.
Several nonparametric estimators are available, which are computed from order statis-
tics of returns, to estimate the tail index and the corresponding unconditional large quan-
tile (see Dekkers and de Haan, 1989, and Hols and de Vries, 1991). We opt for the tail
index estimator proposed by Hill (1975) because it performs well in finite samples, as
shown by Hols and de Vries (1991), and it has gained strong popularity in the literature.
Let y(1) ≤ y(2) ≤ ... ≤ y(T ) be the order statistics of the bond yield sample of country i,
7Among the various methods to date crises, Pesaran and Pick (2007) set the threshold equal to two
standard deviations of yjt, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) compute a crisis index based on early warning
variables, and Sy (2004) calculates implied probabilities of sovereign default. However, many papers date
financial crises a priori, relying on anecdotical evidence, see, e.g., King and Wadhwani (1990), Forbes
and Rigobon (2002), or Dungey and Martin (2007), to name but a few.
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y1, ..., yT , where we suppress the index i for simplicity. Hill’s inverse tail index estimator
is defined as:
γˆT (m) ≡
1
αˆT (m)
=
1
m
m∑
k=1
(
log(y(T+1−k))− log(y(T−m))
)
. (9)
The estimator is asymptotically distributed as γˆT (m) ∼ N(0, γ
2). Once γ is estimated, it
can be used to determine which return level τ corresponds to a given low probability p -
usually 1% or 5% - of an extreme event. Dekkers and de Haan (1989), and Hols and de
Vries (1991) propose the following consistent large quantile estimator:
τˆ (p, T ) =
(m/pT )γˆT (m) − 1
1− 2−γˆT (m)
(
y(T−m/2) − y(T−m)
)
+ y(T−m/2). (10)
The only uncertainty comes from choosing the parameter m corresponding to the mth
order statistic y(m). Danielsson et al. (2001) propose a two-step bootstrap procedure to
estimate mˆopt(T ), the asymptotically optimal cut-off parameter. The method is based on
minimizing the asymptotic mean squared error (AMSE) of γˆT (m), where the AMSE is:
AMSE(T,m) = AsyE(γT (m)− γ)
2. (11)
In brief, the bootstrap algorithm is as follows. Define:
MˆT (m) =
1
m
m∑
k=1
(
log(y(T+1−k))− log(y(T−m))
)2
. (12)
Let T1 < T , and draw from y1, ..., yT , B bootstrap samples of size T1, and obtain the
corresponding order statistics, y∗(k), where k = 1, ..., T1. Denote by γˆ
∗
T1
(m1) the bootstrap
Hill statistic computed from y∗(k) as in eq. (9). For a range of different values of m1,
calculate the bootstrap estimate of AMSE(T,m) as:
ÂMSE(T1, m1) = E
((
Mˆ∗T1(m1)− 2(γˆ
∗
T1
(m1))
2
)2)
. (13)
Subsequently, obtain via grid search mˆ∗opt1 (T1) = argmin ÂMSE(T1, m1). Repeat this
procedure for a resample size T2 < T1 (e.g., T2 = T
2
1 /T ), and compute mˆ
∗opt
2 (T2) =
argmin ÂMSE(T2, m2). The optimal cut-off parameter mˆ
opt(T ) is then calculated as:
mˆopt(T ) =
(mˆ∗opt1 (T1))
2
mˆ∗opt2 (T2)
( (
log
(
mˆ∗opt1 (T1)
))2(
2 log(T1)− log
(
mˆ∗opt1 (T1)
))2
) log(T1)−log(mˆ∗opt1 (T1))
log(T1)
. (14)
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In this procedure T1 is chosen to minimize R(T1) = (ÂMSE(T1, m
∗opt
1 ))
2/ÂMSE(T2, m
∗opt
2 ),
while in the applications we set the bootstrap sample size to B = 1000.
Finally, substituting eq. (14) into eq. (9), the optimal inverse tail index estimator is
γˆT (mˆ
opt(T )), and this is subsequently used to compute the EVT crisis threshold in eq.
(10).
The consistency of the Hill estimator for dependent data has been established by Hsing
(1991). Furthermore, Danielsson et al. (2001) investigate the finite sample performance
of the estimators γˆT (m) and mˆ
opt(T ) for processes with MA(1) and ARCH(1) dependence,
and the estimators perform reasonably well in terms of bias and RMSE, even though the
latter are somewhat higher in small samples.
2.3.2. The Value-at-Risk Threshold
The Value-at-Risk (VaR) of an asset portfolio is essentially a p-percent quantile of
the conditional distribution of returns earned on this portfolio. VaR analysis has been
promoted forcefully by the Bank of International Settlements, and has been adopted by
large financial institutions as a standard to evaluate the risks of loss associated with their
assets. At the same time, VaR has spurred a large methodological literature (see, for
instance, Christoffersen et al., 2001, and Berkowitz and O’Brien, 2002). Without loss of
generality, we opt for the most common parametric VaR method.
Let the bond yield process in eq. (1) for country i be expressed as:
yit = µit + uit, (15)
where µit denotes the conditional mean of this process, and uit is defined as earlier.
The VaR for a long position in government bonds over the time horizon t with coverage
probability p is defined as the conditional quantile V aRit|t−1(p), where:
Pr(yit < V aRit|t−1(p)|Ft−1) = p. (16)
We assume that the conditional variance of the bond yield follows a Gaussian GARCH(1,1)
process:
σ2it = ωi + γiu
2
it−1 + κiσ
2
it−1, (17)
where uit = σitvit (vit ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1)), ωi > 0, γi, κi ≥ 0. The one-step-ahead p percent
conditional quantile (i.e., the VaR crisis threshold) is:
τit(σ
2
it) ≡ V aRit|t−1(p) = µit + Φ
−1(p)σit, (18)
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where Φ−1(p) denotes the pth quantile of the standard normal distribution.
Nevertheless, if we assume that the true data generating process is eq. (1) with
the endogenous crisis thresholds C2+it and C
2−
it , and we attempt to estimate eq. (15)
using conventional methods, then, due to the identification problems discussed earlier,
the conditional mean equation for µit will be misspecified. To overcome this difficulty,
we follow Lumsdaine and Ng (1999), who propose a robust two-step procedure to tackle
the problem of a misspecified mean, which is based on minimizing the bias due to general
forms of misspecification.
In the first step, we perform recursive estimation of yit on the observed variables gt
and sit from the (h + 1)
th observation over the remaining T − h observations for some
predetermined h, and we obtain the recursive residuals εˆit =yit − (g
′
t, s
′
it)
′
ηˆit−1. If the
mean equation is misspecified, εˆit conveys information about the true conditional mean.
Therefore, in the second step we estimate:
yit = (g
′
t, s
′
it)
′
ηi + f(εˆit−1) + ǫit, (19)
where, since the crisis indicator is a nonlinear function, we define f(εˆit−1) = ϕi1εˆit−1 +
ϕi2εˆ
2
it−1. The residuals of the latter regression, ǫit, are robust to misspecification in the
conditional mean, and can be used to compute the VaR measure defined earlier.
Notice, that under the VaR formulation of the crisis indicator, the threshold τjt(σ
2
jt)
is still conditional on the t − 1 information set, Ft−1. Therefore, the identification and
estimation results established in Section 2.2 and in Pesaran and Pick (2007) readily carry
over to this specification.
3. Empirical Results
3.1. The Data
In the empirical analysis, we use time series for 18 advanced economies retrieved from
Datastream. The data set forms a balanced panel from May 1, 2000 to September 1, 2010.
The countries included in the sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech
Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United States. We take the yields on ten-year
benchmark government bonds of each country as our dependent variable. The global
observed common factors are the U.S. federal funds rate and the yield spread, the latter
is calculated as the difference between 3-months yields on Moody’s AAA-rated corporate
bonds and U.S. Treasury bills. The country specific factors that capture local financial
market conditions are the Datastream-calculated price indices of the (total) stock market
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of each country expressed in euros, and lagged dependent variables are included to control
for country-specific dynamics.
U.S. short-run interest rates are considered as a good candidate to encompass global
macroeconomic developments and the associated inflation, liquidity, and credit risks (see,
e.g., Forbes and Rigobon, 2002, and Dungey et al., 2005). It is also well-known that
leading indicators of the business cycle, such as yield spreads, have some predictive power
for financial returns (see, e.g., Fama and French, 1989). Furthermore, the inclusion of
country-specific stock market indices can be motivated on two grounds. First, it has been
argued in a multitude of papers, including Hartmann et al. (2004), Pavlova and Rigobon
(2007), and Dungey et al. (2007), that contagion should not be studied by considering
markets in isolation, as there are interaction effects across different asset classes. Second,
the typical investment universe of large institutional investors is mainly comprised of
stocks and bonds, hence we can control for wealth and substitution effects within such
portfolios.
In theory, the U.S. federal funds rate reacts in response to business cycle fluctuations
with the aim to smooth the cycle. Its change feeds through the U.S. yield curve to
longer maturities, and affects global demand and portfolio decisions (since the USD is the
most widely held reserve currency). Thus, an increasing federal funds rate, which signals
a monetary tightening in the U.S., should lead to ceteris paribus higher long-maturity
sovereign bond yields worldwide. Similarly, a widening of the U.S. yield spread, which
anticipates a business cycle downturn, should lead to an increase in the perceived riskiness
of long term government bonds and a corresponding rise in sovereign bond yields.
The stock market index reflects financial market conditions and general investor sen-
timent in a particular country. There are various channels of market interaction between
stocks and bonds. First, when the expected returns on domestic stocks relative to bonds
change, investors may substitute stocks and bonds in their portfolio (domestic substitu-
tion effect). Second, in forward-looking financial markets, the evolution of stock prices
may be a leading indicator of the business cycle (domestic expectations effect). These
two effects suggest a positive relation: higher stock market returns are expected to result
in ceteris paribus higher long term government bond yields. On the other hand, when
the stock market is booming and investors are bullish, the willingness of international
risk-taking increases, and if domestic and foreign assets are imperfect substitutes, then
international risk-premiums decline along the lines of modern portfolio theory (interna-
tional substitution effect). Besides, with an increase in the wealth of investors, they may
invest in stocks and bonds in similar proportions (international wealth effect). These two
effects suggest an inverse relation: a booming stock market should lead to ceteris paribus
13
lower long-maturity yields.
3.2. Preliminary Analysis
Since high-frequency financial data are often subject to market microstructure noise,
we compute five-day non-overlapping weekly averages of the daily data.8
Figure 1 depicts the 10-year government bond yields of the countries that came under
the most severe pressure during the spring 2010 bond market debacle (notably, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), and the yields on the German benchmark bond which
usually acts as a safe haven for panicking investors.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The figure discloses a sharp divergence in bond yield dynamics that began at the height of
the global credit crisis in 2008. In particular, the yields on Greek bonds have skyrocketed
towards an unusually high peak, followed by the other countries under strains, while there
has been a flight-to-quality to the bonds issued by the German government. It can thus
be induced that the uncertainties related to the sustainability of government fiscal balance
are clearly echoed in the response of sovereign bond markets.
Table 1 presents the contemporaneous correlation matrix of the changes in sovereign
bond yields.
[Insert Table 1 here]
The correlations amongst developed sovereign debt markets reveal several patterns. First,
the strongest correlations are observed between the core countries of the eurozone. This
suggests that the monetary union formed by these countries is grounded on strongly syn-
chronized financial markets. Second, Greece constitutes an exception to these remarkably
high figures, which is most likely attributable to the recent divergence of its bond market
from the German benchmark (and from the remainder of the core EMU countries), as
depicted in Figure 1. Third, the contemporaneous links between all developed countries
and the Czech Republic seem to be at best moderate, which may signal a time-varying
exchange risk premium demanded by foreign investors in the Czech market. Fourth, and
not surprisingly, the correlation pattern for Canada and the U.S. fits in well with the
8Another alternative followed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Bekaert et al. (2005) would be to
compute two-day rolling returns. However, this filtering is likely to generate artificial serial dependence
in the data. On the other hand, we restrain ourselves from using low-frequency data because the EVT
and VaR methods described earlier require relatively large T . Moreover, as financial markets typically
adjust to shocks upon impact, sampling more sparsely may result in the loss of substantial information
because contagion is an inherently high-frequency phenomenon.
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core countries of the euro area. Finally, the low cross-correlation of the Japanese bond
yields with the remainder of the sample should not come as a surprise since the Japanese
economy has undergone a decade of corporate balance-sheet consolidation during which
the market was less responsive to financial impulses. To conclude, Table 1 provides evi-
dence for substantial cross-country interdependence, which justifies the relevance of the
canonical contagion model.
3.3. Model Specification
Based on conventional unit root tests (omitted here, but available upon request from
the author), we cannot reject the hypotheses that the variables in levels have a unit root
at the 5% significance level, whereas the changes are covariance-stationary. Therefore,
we estimate our model on percentage changes of yields which are computed as yit =
(Yit − Yit−1)/Yit−1, where Yit is the sovereign bond yield of country i in period t. We
compute the change of the federal funds rate (gFFRt ) and the U.S. yield spread (g
Y SP
t )
analogously. The returns on the stock market index (sSMIit ) are given by the log-difference
of the series.
We compute the 5% and 95% unconditional as well as conditional quantile estimators
(EVT and VaR thresholds) on the weekly series. To ensure comparability of the results
across the models, we perform all estimations from the 2nd week of December, 2001 to
the 4th week of August, 2010, thus N = 18 and T = 437. To establish the robustness of
our results to the way credit crises are defined, we present the estimation results with the
EVT thresholds, the VaR thresholds, and the thresholds set at two standard deviations of
the bond yield changes (in accordance with Pesaran and Pick, 2007). Figures 2-4 provide
a visual representation of these three crisis dating methods.
[Insert Figures 2-4 here]
While the VaR thresholds can naturally accommodate volatility clusters, Figures 2-4
reveal the strong sample dependence of the other two methods, which is a clear weakness
compared to the VaR method. The EVT and two-standard-deviations thresholds for the
full sample are reported in Table 2.
[Insert Table 2 here]
The estimated EVT and two-standard-deviations thresholds closely resemble each other,
although the EVT method captures the leverage effect inherent in financial time series,
hence the asymmetry of the upside- and downside-risk EVT thresholds.
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In order to ensure the exogeneity of the regressors, we estimate the model on the
first lag of the change of the federal funds rate, the yield spread, and the stock market
returns, and we allow for country-specific lags in the bond yield changes. We select the
optimal autoregressive lag for each country based on the conventional Schwarz (SIC),
Akaike (AIC), and Hannan-Quinn (HQIC) criteria, the results are given in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 here]
3.4. Estimation Results
The estimation results with the EVT crisis indicator C1it, the VaR crisis indicator C
2
it,
and with the two-standard-deviations indicator are presented in Tables 4-6.9
[Insert Tables 4-6 here]
We reject the null hypothesis of ’no shift-contagion’ in case of the upside-risk, as well as
the downside-risk credit events for all countries at the 5% significance level. This result
is crucial, as it signals that even countries with a consolidated fiscal position (among
others, Australia or Norway) are exposed to the external risk of contagion during periods
of market turbulence. The estimated contagion effects are remarkably robust and differ
only marginally across the three definitions of credit crises. Hence, the model appears
to capture a fundamental feature present in the data generating process. The message
conveyed in this outcome is clear: at times of stress, the cross-country linkages among bond
markets change significantly with respect to calm periods due to extraneous factors beyond
the fundamental channels of interdependence. Since these changes may be traced back to
shifts between multiple equilibria fueled by self-fulfilling beliefs, it is in the individual best
interest of each country to act in concert with others in order to reassure international
investors of the commitment to a balanced fiscal path.
Most countries respond significantly to changes of the U.S. federal funds rate: rising
U.S. short-run interest rates increase bond yields (with the exception of Czech Republic,
Norway, and Portugal, depending on the model specification). Similarly, there is a sig-
nificant and positive response worldwide to the widening of the U.S. yield spread. Local
stock market indices have a significant impact on bond markets for most countries, and
a surge in stock markets leads consistently to a decline in bond yields. This suggests
that the strongest channels of stock and bond market interaction are the international
substitution and wealth effects generated by the large fraction of international investors
9To preserve a compact representation of the results, we report them only up to the first lag of the
dependent variable.
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active in the market. In summary, these findings serve as evidence for strong observed
macroeconomic interdependence which results from a high degree of developed capital
market integration.
We also report the crisis frequencies, which correspond to the ratio between the num-
ber of crisis and non-crisis observations for each country.10 These figures reveal that
the EVT and the two-standard-deviations indicators are conservative measures of credit
crises. In particular, the EVT indicator appears to be undersized in most cases. We
acknowledge that this deficiency may be due to the finite sample performance of the
estimators proposed by Danielsson et al. (2001) for our moderate T . In contrast, the
VaR indicator attains an empirical size that is close to the 5% nominal size, although in
some cases it tends to be oversized because, unlike the EVT indicator, it is not suited for
accommodating the asymmetries of the leverage effect.
3.5. Robustness
We perform a series of diagnostic tests to guard against model misspecification, includ-
ing the Cragg-Donald test statistic for weak instruments (see Cragg and Donald, 1993),
residual serial correlation LM tests, and the modified Tsay (1986) test on the residuals for
the null of linearity, which has power against a wide range of nonlinearities (see Harvill
and Ray, 1999). Furthermore, to assess the structural stability of the canonical model,
we split the sample into two periods of equal length at the 3rd week of April, 2006, and
perform the estimations on the two sub-samples.
The model diagnostic tests are given in Table 7.
[Insert Table 7 here]
In order to assess the weak instrument problem documented by Dungey et al. (2006)
and Pick (2007), Table 7 reports the Cragg-Donald statistic. The null hypothesis of weak
instruments cannot be rejected at the 5% level for all countries and model specifications,
based on the critical values with two endogenous regressors tabulated by Stock and Yogo
(2005). This result indicates that the statistical significance of the contagion coefficients
should be regarded with some caution, although it is in accordance with the empirical
findings of Pesaran and Pick (2007) and Pick (2007). However, we do not modify our
instrument set because all available instruments ensure the best empirical size and power
(see Pick, 2007). Upon inspection of the serial correlation LM tests computed with 5 and
10 lags, we find that residual autocorrelation is eliminated with all model specifications in
10Note that this ratio does not necessarily coincide with the ratio of ones to zeros in C1it and C
2
it, since
the latter dummies accumulate the number of crises observed across countries.
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the majority of the countries, in particular, the VaR model performs best while the two-
standard-deviations model performs worst in this respect. This result can be presumably
attributed to the low empirical size achieved by the crisis indicators used in the EVT and
two-standard-deviations models, and the residual autocorrelation may reflect the omitted
crisis periods that were successfully detected with the VaR specification. These results
suggest that the use of the HAC estimator is justified.
Turning to the evaluation of structural stability, we cannot reject the null of linearity
of the Tsay test at the 5% level for all countries and specifications, which provides strong
evidence for residual stability. The sub-sample results are reported in the Appendix, in
Tables A1-A3, and the corresponding sub-sample thresholds are given in Table A4. Even
though there is some moderate variation of the crisis frequencies as well as the crisis
thresholds across the two sub-samples, the estimated coefficients reinforce the evidence
on the structural stability of our results across the sub-samples, as they do not show
any major discrepancies with the full sample estimates. Moreover, the tables reveal an
interesting pattern of the global factors: in the first sub-sample the federal funds rate
exerts a strong negative, while in the second a strong positive effect on the bond yields
of several countries, including the United Kingdom and the United States. This finding
corroborates the idea that the U.S. monetary policy was pro-cyclical in the first half of
the decade.
We may conclude that the three crisis indicators perform similarly. However, we favor
the volatility-based VaR crisis indicator because it yields independently distributed crisis
observations, and it is therefore more reliable in dating credit crises independently of the
sample choice (see Figures 2-4). Hence, overall the VaR model specification provides the
best model.
Nevertheless, some comments are in order with respect to potentially omitted vari-
ables. First, it may be desirable to include macro-fundamentals (e.g., industrial produc-
tion or inflation) and fiscal variables (for example, debt-to-GDP or deficit-to-GDP ratios,
or net interest payments as a percentage of GDP). However, macroeconomic variables
are usually observed at low frequencies, and since financial markets are forward-looking
and lead the real economy in the short-run, real variables exert their influence on the
long-run component of financial market volatility (see Fama and French, 1989, and Engle
and Rangel, 2008). Therefore, the potential added value of these variables in our analysis
appears to be ambiguous. Second, another set of potentially omitted variables consists of
news and announcements related to long-term credit outlook. For example, fiscal policy
decisions or credit rating changes. Indeed, a large body of literature has focused on the
effects of a sovereign credit rating change of one country on the sovereign credit spreads
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of other countries, and typically the effects are asymmetric: rating downgrades can be
associated with an increase in spreads, while the effect of upgrades is less pronounced (see
Gande and Parsley, 2005).
4. Concluding Remarks
The main contribution of this paper to the growing literature on financial contagion
is twofold. First, implementing a heteroskedasticity-robust version of a well-established
nonlinear simultaneous equations model of contagion, it provides statistical evidence that
developed countries are subject to a severe risk of contagion whenever a credit crisis
is unfolding in another country or a group of countries. The message conveyed in this
outcome is clear: at times of stress, governments need to act in concert in order to
reassure the markets of their commitment to a balanced fiscal path. Second, two new
crisis indicators are proposed, one that takes into account extreme features, and another
which is a function of the time-varying volatility in the credit market. These indicators
are inherited from the Value-at-Risk literature, hence they are easy to implement and
their statistical properties are well-established.
The empirical analysis unravels a strong interdependence between developed sovereign
credit markets. In advanced economies, the yields on long-maturity government bonds re-
spond overwhelmingly positively to monetary tightening in the U.S., and there are strong
contemporaneous links across core euro area bond markets. Furthermore, a booming local
stock market typically translates into ceteris paribus lower long term yields, which sig-
nals that the channels of interaction between stock and bond markets are dominated by
international substitution and wealth effects, rather than domestic portfolio-rebalancing
or expectations on the country-specific business cycle. In summary, these findings pro-
vide evidence for a high degree of developed capital market integration over the analyzed
period.
Developed economies are facing complex difficulties, as they have suffered large fiscal
costs in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. Their cyclically adjusted
fiscal balances dropped from around zero in 2007 to around minus four percent of GDP
by the first half of 2009. Besides, a sharp decline in potential GDP and sizable bank
rescue packages are likely to constrain the scope of fiscal consolidation over the coming
years. Due to the costs of the welfare state combined with aging populations, developed
countries could also be facing increasing risks to long-run debt sustainability if they fail
to undertake structural reforms, particularly in their pension and healthcare systems.
Following the Mediterranean credit crisis, an international policy debate has emerged
on the future of European fiscal policy, involving the European Central Bank, the Inter-
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national Monetary Fund, and the national governments. As a result, several proposals
have been advanced on a new mechanism of credit crisis management. A sovereign en-
tity can in principle always alleviate its debt burden by raising taxes, which renders de
facto sovereign defaults a mere theoretical possibility. In spite of this, our findings con-
vey considerable policy implications in terms of sovereign debt management. The main
conclusion is that even countries with a solid fiscal position cannot avoid international
bond market contagion. This external risk carries adverse effects on the financing con-
straints of the public as well as the corporate sector. Therefore, a strong commitment to
the supranational coordination of long-term debt policies may be inevitable, and a new
regional mechanism for the prevention and resolution of debt crises is expedient in the
near future.
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Figure 1: 10-year government bond yields of selected countries (expressed in %)
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Note: 10-year maturity benchmark government bond yields of selected countries at daily frequency.
Sample: May 1, 2000 – September 1, 2010.
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Figure 2: Crisis thresholds
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Note: Crisis thresholds computed with the EVT, VaR, and two-standard-deviations methods.
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Figure 3: Crisis thresholds - continued
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Note: Crisis thresholds computed with the EVT, VaR, and two-standard-deviations methods.
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Figure 4: Crisis thresholds - continued
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Note: Crisis thresholds computed with the EVT, VaR, and two-standard-deviations methods.
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Table 1: Correlation matrix of sovereign bond yield changes
Countries Aus Aut Bel Can CzR Fin Fra Ger Gre Ire Ita Jap Net Nor Por Spa UK US
Australia 1 0.68 0.67 0.75 0.28 0.72 0.74 0.75 0.36 0.49 0.60 0.34 0.71 0.58 0.50 0.60 0.68 0.75
Austria – 1 0.92 0.68 0.42 0.92 0.94 0.88 0.53 0.69 0.82 0.37 0.92 0.67 0.68 0.81 0.71 0.72
Belgium – – 1 0.67 0.42 0.89 0.94 0.86 0.56 0.75 0.87 0.39 0.93 0.65 0.73 0.83 0.71 0.70
Canada – – – 1 0.27 0.71 0.73 0.75 0.31 0.45 0.59 0.36 0.71 0.56 0.47 0.59 0.71 0.84
Czech Republic – – – – 1 0.39 0.41 0.36 0.27 0.35 0.46 0.24 0.41 0.35 0.39 0.45 0.28 0.30
Finland – – – – – 1 0.96 0.94 0.49 0.67 0.80 0.40 0.95 0.70 0.65 0.78 0.75 0.74
France – – – – – – 1 0.95 0.49 0.70 0.84 0.39 0.96 0.72 0.67 0.82 0.78 0.76
Germany – – – – – – – 1 0.41 0.60 0.75 0.40 0.94 0.74 0.58 0.76 0.81 0.78
Greece – – – – – – – – 1 0.75 0.64 0.17 0.50 0.34 0.85 0.66 0.34 0.32
Ireland – – – – – – – – – 1 0.78 0.26 0.69 0.45 0.87 0.81 0.50 0.50
Italy – – – – – – – – – – 1 0.35 0.84 0.60 0.78 0.87 0.61 0.63
Japan – – – – – – – – – – – 1 0.39 0.37 0.27 0.35 0.34 0.35
Netherlands – – – – – – – – – – – – 1 0.69 0.67 0.82 0.77 0.74
Norway – – – – – – – – – – – – – 1 0.46 0.58 0.56 0.59
Portugal – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 1 0.82 0.50 0.49
Spain – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 1 0.67 0.61
United Kingdom – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 1 0.73
United States – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 1
Note: Contemporaneous correlation matrix of sovereign bond yield changes. The asymptotic standard error is T−1/2 = 437−1/2 = 0.0478.
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Table 2: Crisis thresholds
Sample Estimated thresholds
countries τˆEV T+i τˆ
EV T−
i τˆ
2std
i
Australia 0.0382 0.0418 0.0397
Austria 0.0303 0.0389 0.0386
Belgium 0.0358 0.0333 0.0367
Canada 0.0391 0.0395 0.0414
Czech Republic 0.0310 0.0411 0.0462
Finland 0.0370 0.0410 0.0383
France 0.0371 0.0441 0.0370
Germany 0.0440 0.0618 0.0408
Greece 0.0500 0.0306 0.0526
Ireland 0.0407 0.0338 0.0454
Italy 0.0507 0.0263 0.0338
Japan 0.0841 0.0533 0.0914
Netherlands 0.0346 0.0409 0.0379
Norway 0.0343 0.0351 0.0383
Portugal 0.0377 0.0367 0.0445
Spain 0.0355 0.0382 0.0372
United Kingdom 0.0380 0.0426 0.0425
United States 0.0777 0.0506 0.0589
Note: Columns 2-3 report the esti-
mated thresholds using EVT for the upside-
and downside-risk credit events, respectively
(τˆEV T+i and τˆ
EV T−
i ), and column 4 reports
2-times the full-sample standard deviations
(τˆ2stdi ).
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Table 3: Autoregressive lag length selection
Sample Lag selection criteria
countries SIC AIC HQIC
Australia -7.83 -7.89 -7.86
AR lags 8 8 8
Austria -7.90 -7.96 -7.94
AR lags 7 7 7
Belgium -8.01 -8.08 -8.05
AR lags 1 1 1
Canada -7.78 -7.85 -7.82
AR lags 6 6 6
Czech Republic -7.61 -7.67 -7.65
AR lags 3 3 3
Finland -7.92 -7.98 -7.96
AR lags 1 1 1
France -7.99 -8.06 -8.03
AR lags 5 5 5
Germany -7.80 -7.86 -7.83
AR lags 8 8 8
Greece -7.33 -7.40 -7.37
AR lags 6 6 6
Ireland -7.60 -7.66 -7.63
AR lags 7 7 7
Italy -8.16 -8.22 -8.19
AR lags 1 1 1
Japan -6.26 -6.32 -6.29
AR lags 8 8 8
Netherlands -7.93 -8.00 -7.97
AR lags 1 1 1
Norway -7.90 -7.96 -7.94
AR lags 5 5 5
Portugal -7.66 -7.72 -7.70
AR lags 7 7 7
Spain -7.99 -8.05 -8.03
AR lags 7 7 7
United Kingdom -7.73 -7.80 -7.77
AR lags 8 8 8
United States -7.07 -7.13 -7.11
AR lags 8 8 8
Note: Lag length selection of the lagged
dependent variable yit−p. We report the
Schwarz, the Akaike, and the Hannan-Quinn
information criteria (SIC = log σ˜2u(p) +
((log T )/T )p, AIC = log σ˜2u(p) + (2/T )p, and
HQIC = log σ˜2u(p) + (2(log logT )/T )p, where
σ˜2u(p) = T
−1
∑T
t=1 u
2
t (p)), and the corre-
sponding autoregressive lag length (AR lags).
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Table 4: Estimation results with EVT crisis indicators
Sample Observed regressors Shift-Contagion Crisis Freq.
countries gFFRt−1 g
Y SP
t−1 s
SMI
it−1 yit−1 C
+
it C
−
it Ups. Downs.
Australia 0.0310* 0.0132 -0.0119 0.1755* 0.0146* -0.0143* 2.29 % 2.06 %
(0.0040) (0.0070) (0.0194) (0.0307) (0.0014) (0.0009) – –
Austria 0.0094 0.0089 -0.0607* 0.0916* 0.0148* -0.0226* 6.41% 2.52%
(0.0053) (0.0094) (0.0155) (0.0214) (0.0014) (0.0013) – –
Belgium 0.0164* 0.0346* 0.0087 0.0736* 0.0154* -0.0183* 2.97% 4.12%
(0.0037) (0.0080) (0.0066) (0.0185) (0.0009) (0.0009) – –
Canada 0.0275* -0.0029 -0.0456* 0.1763* 0.0127* -0.0161* 2.75% 3.43%
(0.0043) (0.0050) (0.0170) (0.0231) (0.0015) (0.0011) – –
Czech Republic -0.0088* 0.0373* -0.1464* 0.0893* 0.0110* -0.0107* 6.86% 3.20%
(0.0036) (0.0120) (0.0161) (0.0140) (0.0015) (0.0008) – –
Finland 0.0182* 0.0297* -0.0321* 0.0602* 0.0150* -0.0188* 2.97% 2.75%
(0.0060) (0.0062) (0.0050) (0.0103) (0.0012) (0.0009) – –
France 0.0152* 0.0086 -0.0795* 0.1736* 0.0164* -0.0202* 2.97% 1.37%
(0.0048) (0.0090) (0.0120) (0.0204) (0.0012) (0.0010) – –
Germany 0.0190* 0.0091 -0.1002* 0.2703* 0.0135* -0.0185* 1.83% 0.69%
(0.0051) (0.0078) (0.0172) (0.0253) (0.0013) (0.0011) – –
Greece 0.0911* 0.1566* 0.0942* 0.4200* 0.0450* -0.0225* 3.20% 3.43%
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0000) (0.0040) (0.0004) (0.0002) – –
Ireland 0.0304* 0.0258* -0.0028* 0.0594* 0.0199* -0.0152* 2.75% 2.97%
(0.0062) (0.0078) (0.0112) (0.0171) (0.0012) (0.0010) – –
Italy 0.0131* 0.0294* -0.0466 0.0461* 0.0133* -0.0139* 0.69% 5.72%
(0.0060) (0.0093) (0.0104) (0.0153) (0.0006) (0.0008) – –
Japan 0.0021 0.0568* 0.2355* 0.3893* 0.0145* -0.0172* 2.29% 5.95%
(0.0042) (0.0203) (0.0471) (0.0413) (0.0015) (0.0015) – –
Netherlands 0.0126* 0.0414* -0.0054 0.0254* 0.0154* -0.0204* 2.75% 2.52%
(0.0026) (0.0072) (0.0051) (0.0038) (0.0010) (0.0010) – –
Norway -0.0182* 0.0179* 0.0095 0.1755* 0.0115* -0.0116* 3.20% 3.89%
(0.0026) (0.0084) (0.0141) (0.0106) (0.0008) (0.0008) – –
Portugal 0.0693* 0.1892* -1.6130* 0.4527* 0.0748* -0.0538* 4.12% 3.20%
(0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0380) (0.0107) (0.0009) (0.0013) – –
Spain -0.0022 0.0210* -0.0287* 0.0865* 0.0194* -0.0170* 2.97% 2.97%
(0.0052) (0.0086) (0.0144) (0.0126) (0.0009) (0.0008) – –
United Kingdom 0.0388* 0.0136 -0.0033 0.1290* 0.0164* -0.0174* 3.20% 2.97%
(0.0030) (0.0080) (0.0197) (0.0216) (0.0009) (0.0009) – –
United States 0.0286* -0.0084 -0.0868* 0.2112* 0.0249* -0.0260* 1.37% 2.97%
(0.0068) (0.0090) (0.0312) (0.0217) (0.0013) (0.0015) – –
Note: Estimation results of the canonical contagion model in eq. (1) with the EVT crisis thresholds.
gFFRt−1 denotes the change of the U.S. federal funds rate, g
Y SP
t−1 is the U.S. yield spread, s
SMI
it−1 is the
stock market return of country i, yit−1 is the first lag of the sovereign bond yield of country i, while
C+it and C
−
it are the upside-risk and downside-risk crisis indicators, respectively. The crisis frequencies
(’Crisis Freq.’) correspond to the ratio between the number of crisis and non-crisis observations for
each country. ’Ups.’ are upside-, ’Downs.’ are downside-risk events. HAC standard errors are reported
in brackets, and asterisks (*) denote significance at the 5% level.
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Table 5: Estimation results with VaR crisis indicators
Sample Observed regressors Shift-Contagion Crisis Freq.
countries gFFRt−1 g
Y SP
t−1 s
SMI
it−1 yit−1 C
+
it C
−
it Ups. Downs.
Australia 0.0293* 0.0210* -0.0287 0.1911* 0.0138* -0.0163* 5.49% 4.81%
(0.0040) (0.0073) (0.0175) (0.0254) (0.0009) (0.0006) – –
Austria 0.0078 0.0082 -0.0876* 0.0855* 0.0158* -0.0235* 7.32% 5.95%
(0.0055) (0.0059) (0.0128) (0.0232) (0.0009) (0.0010) – –
Belgium 0.0235* 0.0231* -0.0398* 0.1057* 0.0143* -0.0197* 8.01% 6.41%
(0.0032) (0.0057) (0.0130) (0.0168) (0.0010) (0.0008) – –
Canada 0.0391* -0.0040 -0.0657* 0.2346* 0.0151* -0.0190* 5.03% 5.26%
(0.0027) (0,0081) (0.0089) (0.0189) (0.0009) (0.0011) – –
Czech Republic -0.0055* 0.0362* -0.1404* 0.0858* 0.0093* -0.0133* 6.41% 4.58%
(0.0028) (0.0083) (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0007) (0.0004) – –
Finland 0.0207* 0.0380* -0.0473* 0.0779* 0.0159* -0.0224* 7.09% 6.64%
(0.0039) (0.0058) (0.0047) (0.0123) (0.0009) (0.0009) – –
France 0.0249* 0.0152* -0.0970* 0.1744* 0.0147* -0.0211* 6.86% 6.18%
(0.0031) (0.0046) (0.0136) (0.0159) (0.0009) (0.0009) – –
Germany 0.0281* 0.0180* -0.0886* 0.2760* 0.0172* -0.0218* 6.86% 6.18%
(0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0145) (0.0235) (0.0011) (0.0011) – –
Greece 0.0911* 0.1566* 0.0942* 0.4200* 0.0450* -0.0225* 8.92% 5.95%
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0000) (0.0040) (0.0004) (0.0002) – –
Ireland 0.0296* 0.0163* -0.0420* 0.1134* 0.0164* -0.0166* 7.55% 5.72%
(0.0071) (0.0055) (0.0086) (0.0194) (0.0010) (0.0010) – –
Italy 0.0187* 0.0193* -0.0675* 0.0639* 0.0126* -0.0151* 6.41% 5.26%
(0.0021) (0.0060) (0.0064) (0.0099) (0.0005) (0.0005) – –
Japan 0.0055* 0.0304* 0.2093* 0.4447* 0.0149* -0.0166* 4.12% 5.72%
(0.0037) (0.0146) (0.0474) (0.0361) (0.0018) (0.0011) – –
Netherlands 0.0196* 0.0318* -0.0149* 0.0332* 0.0162* -0.0224* 7.09% 6.41%
(0.0055) (0.0062) (0.0070) (0.0067) (0.0009) (0.0005) – –
Norway -0.0208* 0.0075* 0.0111 0.1879* 0.0105* -0.0174* 6.18% 6.64%
(0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0125) (0.0188) (0.0009) (0.0010) – –
Portugal -0.0408* 0.0086* 0.1515* 0.0707* 0.0241* -0.0145* 8.01% 7.09%
(0.0033) (0.0013) (0.0094) (0.0109) (0.0005) (0.0003) – –
Spain 0.0057* 0.0230* -0.0428* 0.1003* 0.0165* -0.0173* 6.64% 7.55%
(0.0051) (0.0066) (0.0124) (0.0136) (0.0009) (0.0010) – –
United Kingdom 0.0412 0.0231* -0.0658* 0.1598* 0.0139* -0.0175* 5.03% 4.81%
(0.0038) (0.0055) (0.0212) (0.0229) (0.0011) (0.0009) – –
United States 0.0404* 0.0115* -0.0760* 0.1832* 0.0209* -0.0278* 5.03% 5.49%
(0.0074) (0.0016) (0.0244) (0.0283) (0.0012) (0.0016) – –
Note: Estimation results of the canonical contagion model in eq. (1) with the VaR crisis thresholds.
gFFRt−1 denotes the change of the U.S. federal funds rate, g
Y SP
t−1 is the U.S. yield spread, s
SMI
it−1 is the
stock market return of country i, yit−1 is the first lag of the sovereign bond yield of country i, while
C+it and C
−
it are the upside-risk and downside-risk crisis indicators, respectively. The crisis frequencies
(’Crisis Freq.’) correspond to the ratio between the number of crisis and non-crisis observations for
each country. ’Ups.’ are upside-, ’Downs.’ are downside-risk events. HAC standard errors are reported
in brackets, and asterisks (*) denote significance at the 5% level.
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Table 6: Estimation results with 2 × std(yit) thresholds
Sample Observed regressors Shift-Contagion Crisis Freq.
countries gFFRt−1 g
Y SP
t−1 s
SMI
it−1 yit−1 C
+
it C
−
it Ups. Downs.
Australia 0.0145* 0.0112 -0.0371* 0.1913* 0.0167* -0.0217* 2.29% 2.52%
(0.0043) (0.0075) (0.0180) (0.0277) (0.0015) (0.0011) – –
Austria -0.0066 0.0044 -0.0893* 0.1064* 0.0151* -0.0297* 2.52% 2.29%
(0.0051) (0.0096) (0.0175) (0.0233) (0.0015) (0.0014) – –
Belgium 0.0189* 0.0217* -0.0203* 0.1209* 0.0151* -0.0224* 2.29% 1.83%
(0.0059) (0.0086) (0.0094) (0.0194) (0.0013) (0.0007) – –
Canada 0.0374* -0.0023 -0.0645* 0.2329* 0.0144* -0.0264* 2.52% 2.97%
(0.0036) (0.0063) (0.0110) (0.0143) (0.0010) (0.0014) – –
Czech Republic -0.0072 0.0370* -0.1355* 0.0886* 0.0118* -0.0098* 2.97% 1.60%
(0.0040) (0.0118) (0.0179) (0.0110) (0.0014) (0.0009) – –
Finland 0.0078* 0.0435* -0.0337* 0.0555* 0.0181* -0.0306* 2.29% 29.7%
(0.0037) (0.0062) (0.0050) (0.0100) (0.0010) (0.0011) – –
France 0.0088 0.0037 -0.1188* 0.2339* 0.0159* -0.0272* 2.29% 3.43%
(0.0051) (0.0088) (0.0128) (0.0219) (0.0011) (0.0011) – –
Germany 0.0090 0.0107 -0.1131* 0.2859* 0.0154* -0.0313* 2.29% 4.12%
(0.0072) (0.0090) (0.0170) (0.0248) (0.0014) (0.0027) – –
Greece 0.2153* 0.1059* 0.3805* -0.2774* 0.0618* -0.0440* 2.75% 0.69%
(0.0034) (0.0018) (0.0064) (0.0084) (0.0008) (0.0009) – –
Ireland 0.0360* 0.0331* -0.0062 0.0964* 0.0208* -0.0159* 2.06% 0.69%
(0.0064) (0.0086) (0.0104) (0.0197) (0.0016) (0.0020) – –
Italy 0.0076 0.0290* -0.0539* 0.0601* 0.0144* -0.0157* 3.20% 1.60%
(0.0043) (0.0082) (0.0109) (0.0154) (0.0005) (0.0009) – –
Japan 0.0034 0.0612* 0.2007* 0.4217* 0.0168* -0.0266* 2.06% 0.92%
(0.0060) (0.0221) (0.0542) (0.0524) (0.0022) (0.0020) – –
Netherlands 0.0152* 0.0435* -0.0086* 0.0266* 0.0169* -0.0285* 1.37% 3.20%
(0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0012) (0.0018) – –
Norway -0.0277* 0.0259* 0.0122 0.1807* 0.0127* -0.0176* 2.06% 2.52%
(0.0014) (0.0078) (0.0104) (0.0160) (0.0005) (0.0008) – –
Portugal -0.0018 0.1341* -0.5029* -0.2163* 0.0887* -0.0790* 2.06% 0.46%
(0.0024) 0.0025) (0.0095) (0.0134) (0.0003) (0.0009) – –
Spain 0.0026 0.0232* -0.0300* 0.1176* 0.0180* -0.0208* 2.29% 2.97%
(0.0047) (0.0062) (0.0147) (0.0128) (0.0010) (0.0014) – –
United Kingdom 0.0357* 0.0212 -0.0213 0.1195* 0.0171* -0.0261* 2.29% 2.97%
(0.0051) (0.0110) (0.0252) (0.0273) (0.0013) (0.0020) – –
United States 0.0268* 0.0011 -0.0986* 0.2019* 0.0278* -0.0379* 2.75% 2.29%
(0.0075) (0.0103) (0.0321) (0.0231) (0.0012) (0.0016) – –
Note: Estimation results of the canonical contagion model in eq. (1) with the crisis thresholds set at
two standard deviations of the sample. gFFRt−1 denotes the change of the U.S. federal funds rate, g
Y SP
t−1 is
the U.S. yield spread, sSMIit−1 is the stock market return of country i, yit−1 is the first lag of the sovereign
bond yield of country i, while C+it and C
−
it are the upside-risk and downside-risk crisis indicators,
respectively. The crisis frequencies (’Crisis Freq.’) correspond to the ratio between the number of
crisis and non-crisis observations for each country. ’Ups.’ are upside-, ’Downs.’ are downside-risk
events. HAC standard errors are reported in brackets, and asterisks (*) denote significance at the 5%
level.
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Table 7: Diagnostic tests
Sample EVT model VaR model 2 × std(yit) model
countries CD LM(5) LM(10) Tsay CD LM(5) LM(10) Tsay CD LM(5) LM(10) Tsay
Australia 1.69 3.98 5.22 0.16 1.26 7.27 9.30 0.03 2.37 7.93 16.67 0.50
– [0.55] [0.88] [0.68] – [0.20] [0.50] [0.86] – [0.16] [0.08] [0.48]
Austria 1.57 22.69* 25.38* 0.05 1.14 14.16* 15.01 0.11 2.00 28.58* 30.22* 0.19
– [0.00] [0.00] [0.82] – [0.01] [0.13] [0.74] – [0.00] [0.00] [0.66]
Belgium 1.68 1.42 4.44 0.83 1.18 3.28 8.70 0.39 2.13 7.79 12.05 0.86
– [0.92] [0.93] [0.36] – [0.66] [0.56] [0.53] – [0.17] [0.28] [0.35]
Canada 1.51 12.37* 18.65 0.11 1.26 13.91* 21.99* 0.06 2.21 15.36* 20.11* 0.00
– [0.03] [0.06] [0.74] – [0.02] [0.02] [0.80] – [0.01] [0.03] [0.97]
Czech Republic 1.94 23.61* 27.65* 2.34 1.34 23.49* 28.41* 2.76 2.47 26.27* 30.77* 3.08
– [0.00] [0.00] [0.13] – [0.00] [0.00] [0.10] – [0.00] [0.00] [0.08]
Finland 1.63 11.41* 13.58 1.38 1.18 7.85 10.72 1.62 2.03 16.51* 19.93* 0.37
– [0.04] [0.19] [0.24] – [0.16] [0.38] [0.20] – [0.01] [0.03] [0.54]
France 1.58 3.52 4.15 1.02 1.17 3.30 9.37 1.53 2.15 6.69 9.13 0.34
– [0.62] [0.94] [0.31] – [0.65] [0.50] [0.22] – [0.24] [0.52] [0.56]
Germany 1.62 0.30 2.06 1.16 1.22 2.18 6.01 3.04 2.21 1.87 9.30 0.11
– [1.00] [1.00] [0.28] – [0.82] [0.81] [0.08] – [0.87] [0.50] [0.74]
Greece 0.36 22.48* 26.45* 0.44 0.36 22.48* 26.45* 0.44 0.10 8.23 18.79* 1.80
– [0.00] [0.00] [0.51] – [0.00] [0.00] [0.51] – [0.14] [0.05] [0.18]
Ireland 1.70 7.79 12.40 2.62 1.29 8.27 15.33 1.95 2.28 9.47 14.47 2.62
– [0.17] [0.26] [0.11] – [0.14] [0.12] [0.16] – [0.09] [0.15] [0.11]
Italy 1.77 0.51 3.26 1.48 1.28 0.20 4.08 0.29 2.29 2.34 5.03 1.46
– [0.99] [0.97] [0.22] – [1.00] [0.94] [0.59] – [0.80] [0.89] [0.23]
Japan 1.51 8.54 20.37* 1.35 1.13 8.71 17.82 1.53 2.06 6.95 18.71* 0.91
– [0.13] [0.03] [0.25] – [0.12] [0.06] [0.22] – [0.22] [0.04] [0.34]
Netherlands 1.61 5.19 7.37 1.85 1.12 5.39 8.62 3.91 1.94 15.16* 19.14* 1.12
– [0.39] [0.69] [0.17] – [0.37] [0.57] [0.06] – [0.01] [0.04] [0.29]
Norway 1.81 4.20 8.29 0.14 1.19 5.87 10.15 0.00 2.43 5.52 11.15 0.02
– [0.52] [0.60] [0.71] – [0.32] [0.43] [0.98] – [0.36] [0.35] [0.88]
Portugal 0.17 44.29* 54.41* 0.61 0.21 13.57* 24.35* 0.07 0.11 18.01* 21.56* 1.20
– [0.00] [0.00] [0.43] – [0.02] [0.01] [0.79] – [0.00] [0.02] [0.27]
Spain 1.55 8.15 14.15 0.34 1.26 5.92 8.73 0.07 2.11 11.01* 16.32 0.22
– [0.15] [0.17] [0.56] – [0.31] [0.56] [0.79] – [0.05] [0.09] [0.64]
United Kingdom 1.47 5.03 10.36 0.74 1.17 3.99 7.53 1.07 2.09 7.27 12.56 0.04
– [0.41] [0.41] [0.39] – [0.55] [0.67] [0.30] – [0.20] [0.25] [0.83]
United States 1.62 3.54 7.81 0.04 1.18 6.57 11.94 0.36 2.09 9.24 12.21 0.00
– [0.62] [0.65] [0.84] – [0.25] [0.29] [0.55] – [0.10] [0.27] [0.99]
Note: Model diagnostic tests. In each panel, ’CD’ stands for the Cragg-Donald statistic, ’LM(5)’ and ’LM(10)’ are the residual
serial correlation LM tests with 5 and 10 lags (computed with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors), and ’Tsay’ is the
Tsay test. Asterisks (*) denote significance at the 5% level and p-values are given in square parentheses. Monte Carlo critical
values for the Cragg-Donald statistic are tabulated in Stock and Yogo (2005).
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Table A1: Sub-sample estimation results with EVT thresholds
Sub-sample: 2001W48 - 2006W14 Sub-sample: 2006W15 - 2010W33
Sample Observed regressors Shift-Contagion Crisis Freq. Observed regressors Shift-Contagion Crisis Freq.
countries gF F Rt−1 g
Y SP
t−1 s
SMI
it−1 yit−1 C
+
it C
−
it Ups. Downs. g
F F R
t−1 g
Y SP
t−1 s
SMI
it−1 yit−1 C
+
it C
−
it Ups. Downs.
Australia -0.0344* 0.0565* -0.0558* 0.0403* 0.0187* -0.0187* 5.03% 5.35% 0.0407* 0.0309* 0.0626* 0.1674* 0.0167* -0.0135* 2.28% 2.74%
(0.0087) (0.0047) (0.0141) (0.0198) (0.0005) (0.0009) – – (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0117) (0.0137) (0.0007) (0.0004) – –
Austria -0.0331* 0.0169* -0.0306* 0.0642* 0.0227* -0.0224* 4.09% 3.77% 0.0100* 0.0164* -0.0473* 0.1657* 0.0184* -0.0227* 1.37% 3.20%
(0.0073) (0.0063) (0.0081) (0.0106) (0.0004) (0.0006) – – (0.0015) (0.0024) (0.0049) (0.0111) (0.0005) (0.0003) – –
Belgium -0.0031 0.0198* -0.0404* 0.0693* 0.0221* -0.0217* 5.97% 3.14% 0.0273* 0.0225* 0.0333* 0.0903* 0.0186* -0.0203* 2.74% 2.28%
(0.0037) (0.0052) (0.0028) (0.0072) (0.0005) (0.0005) – – (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0030) (0.0045) (0.0002) (0.0002) – –
Canada -0.0468* 0.0204* -0.0549* 0.0892* 0.0171* -0.0197* 3.46% 3.46% 0.0436 0.0043* 0.0092 0.2421* 0.0174* -0.0132* 2.28% 6.39%
(0.0053) (0.0074) (0.0122) (0.0119) (0.0006) (0.0004) – – (0.0042) (0.0033) (0.0063) (0.0177) (0.0007) (0.0008) – –
Czech Republic -0.0478* 0.0661* -0.0881* 0.0819* 0.0190* -0.0150* 3.46% 1.57% -0.0019 0.0258* -0.0744* 0.0439* 0.0113* -0.0097* 5.94% 2.74%
(0.0067) (0.0056) (0.0141) (0.0130) (0.0004) (0.0008) – – (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0104) (0.0118) (0.0003) (0.0005) – –
Finland -0.0027 0.0303* -0.0142* 0.0283* 0.0214* -0.0237* 2.20% 3.14% 0.0129* 0.0267* -0.0572* 0.0412* 0.0164* -0.0193* 3.65% 2.28%
(0.0037) (0.0059) (0.0043) (0.0078) (0.0009) (0.0002) – – (0.0018) (0.0032) (0.0051) (0.0037) (0.0005) (0.0006) – –
France -0.0057 0.0082 -0.0564* 0.1022* 0.0207* -0.0213* 2.20% 2.83% 0.0301* 0.0138* -0.0525* 0.2140* 0.0209* -0.0229* 3.20% 3.65%
(0.0070) (0.0066) (0.0090) (0.0110) (0.0005) (0.0006) – – (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0100) (0.0123) (0.0005) (0.0004) – –
Germany -0.0074 0.0269* -0.0444* 0.0726* 0.0201* -0.0221* 2.20% 3.14% 0.0259* 0.0138* -0.0127* 0.2874* 0.0202* -0.0205* 3.20% 2.28%
(0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0057) (0.0117) (0.0002) (0.0005) – – (0.0040) (0.0025) (0.0112) (0.0163) (0.0007) (0.0008) – –
Greece -0.0003 0.0358* -0.0396* 0.1264* 0.0167* -0.0174* 1.89% 3.46% -0.0768* 0.3201* 0.4236* -0.3299* -0.0101* -0.0397* 0.91% 3.65%
(0.0051) (0.0101) (0.0094) (0.0122) (0.0007) (0.0004) – – (0.0064) (0.0125) (0.0000) (0.0620) (0.0009) (0.0012) – –
Ireland 0.0223* 0.0146 -0.0881* 0.0632* 0.0199* -0.0234* 3.14% 1.89% 0.0421* 0.0206* 0.0404* 0.1080* 0.0214* -0.0136* 2.74% 9.13%
(0.0044) (0.0081) (0.0100) (0.0120) (0.0005) (0.0004) – – (0.0031) (0.0025) (0.0062) (0.0093) (0.0005) (0.0006) – –
Italy -0.0070 0.0126* -0.0944* 0.0569* 0.0205* -0.0213* 3.46% 1.57% 0.0138* 0.0217* -0.0619* 0.0372* 0.0129* -0.0153* 3.20% 9.59%
(0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0123) (0.0052) (0.0003) (0.0004) – – (0.0019) (0.0050) (0.0055) (0.0119) (0.0002) (0.0002) – –
Japan 0.0630* 0.1207* 0.3655* 0.3863* 0.0431* -0.0183* 3.14% 1.57% 0.0135* -0.0106 0.0176 0.3855* 0.0177* -0.0166* 4.11% 2.28%
(0.0147) (0.0217) (0.0166) (0.0338) (0.0013) (0.0014) – – (0.0027) (0.0061) (0.0250) (0.0345) (0.0008) (0.0009) – –
Netherlands -0.0021 0.0168* -0.0087 0.0041 0.0242* -0.0236* 1.57% 3.77% 0.0200* 0.0235* 0.0198* 0.0400* 0.0192* -0.0214* 2.74% 2.74%
(0.0066) (0.0038) (0.0047) (0.0027) (0.0004) (0.0003) – – (0.0033) (0.0013) (0.0034) (0.0024) (0.0004) (0.0004) – –
Norway 0.0434* 0.0769* -0.0454* 0.0941* 0.0166* -0.0152* 2.20% 2.83% -0.0182* 0.0065 0.0334* 0.1921* 0.0140* -0.0122* 3.65% 2.74%
(0.0045) (0.0080) (0.0114) (0.0211) (0.0004) (0.0009) – – (0.0022) (0.0037) (0.0073) (0.0165) (0.0005) (0.0005) – –
Portugal 0.0158* 0.0224* 0.0206 0.0391 0.0211* -0.0222* 4.09% 2.83% 0.1316* -0.3952* -0.7536* 1.3747* 0.0060* -0.0199* 3.65% 2.74%
(0.0051) (0.0086) (0.0166) (0.0221) (0.0008) (0.0006) – – (0.0045) (0.0112) (0.0230) (0.0406) (0.0015) (0.0015) – –
Spain 0.0068 0.0319* -0.0326* 0.0623* 0.0184* -0.0223* 2.20% 3.46% 0.0109* 0.0139* -0.0269* 0.0684* 0.0203* -0.0175* 3.20% 4.57%
(0.0053) (0.0044) (0.0103) (0.0130) (0.0005) (0.0007) – – (0.0023) (0.0044) (0.0110) (0.0095) (0.0008) (0.0004) – –
United Kingdom -0.0283* 0.0394* 0.0167 -0.0021 0.0147* -0.0188* 8.49% 1.57% 0.0391* 0.0202* 0.0015 0.2017* 0.0190* -0.0191* 3.65 1.83
(0.0032) (0.0066) (0.0098) (0.0183) (0.0004) (0.0004) – – (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0112) (0.0137) (0.0007) (0.0005) – –
United States -0.0648* 0.0340* 0.0551* 0.0058 0.0263* -0.0285* 2.52% 3.77% 0.0371* 0.0090* -0.0799* 0.1902* 0.0265* -0.0255* 5.94% 1.83%
(0.0071) (0.0110) (0.0097) (0.0224) (0.0006) (0.0006) – – (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0164) (0.0173) (0.0010) (0.0007) – –
Note: See Table 4.
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Table A2: Sub-sample estimation results with VaR thresholds
Sub-sample: 2001W48 - 2006W14 Sub-sample: 2006W15 - 2010W33
Sample Observed regressors Shift-Contagion Crisis Freq. Observed regressors Shift-Contagion Crisis Freq.
countries gF F Rt−1 g
Y SP
t−1 s
SMI
it−1 yit−1 C
+
it C
−
it Ups. Downs. g
F F R
t−1 g
Y SP
t−1 s
SMI
it−1 yit−1 C
+
it C
−
it Ups. Downs.
Australia -0.0370* 0.0910* -0.0702* 0.0905* 0.0210* -0.0159* 5.05% 4.13% 0.0407* 0.0336* 0.0308* 0.1522* 0.0116* -0.0145* 5.93% 5.4795
(0.0091) (0.0087) (0.0156) (0.0173) (0.0004) (0.0007) – – (0.0025) (0.0017) (0.0067) (0.0115) (0.0006) (0.0003) – –
Austria -0.0065 0.0368* -0.1074* 0.1019* 0.0204* -0.0187* 7.33% 5.96% 0.0122* 0.0271* -0.0769* 0.0920* 0.0153* -0.0219* 7.30% 5.93%
(0.0081) (0.0114) (0.0125) (0.0131) (0.0008) (0.0005) – – (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0068) (0.0196) (0.0005) (0.0008) – –
Belgium -0.0016 0.0321* -0.1079* 0.1816* 0.0213* -0.0182* 6.88% 6.42% 0.0210* 0.0287* 0.0067* 0.0662* 0.0152* -0.0181* 9.13% 6.39%
(0.0036) (0.0088) (0.0084) (0.0157) (0.0004) (0.0006) – – (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0065) (0.0090) (0.0005) (0.0003) – –
Canada -0.0448* 0.0398* -0.1111* 0.1885* 0.0144* -0.0149* 3.66% 4.12% 0.0342* 0.0135* -0.0273* 0.2220* 0.0162* -0.0183* 6.39% 6.39%
(0.0047) (0.0112) (0.0075) (0.0146) (0.0010) (0.0004) – – (0.0043) (0.0023) (0.0077) (0.0175) (0.0005) (0.0005) – –
Czech Republic -0.0322* 0.1146* -0.0980* 0.1175* 0.0196* -0.0119* 5.04% 5.04% -0.0022* 0.0273* -0.1160* 0.0703* 0.0067* -0.0120* 7.76% 4.10%
(0.0058) (0.0064) (0.0135) (0.0201) (0.0006) (0.0005) – – (0.0011) (0.0023) (0.0071) (0.0094) (0.0005) (0.0005) – –
Finland 0.0018 0.0410* -0.0533* 0.1174* 0.0216* -0.0202* 6.88% 6.42% 0.0162* 0.0335* -0.0711* 0.0716* 0.0137* -0.0214* 7.30% 6.84%
(0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0025) (0.0098) (0.0009) (0.0005) – – (0.0048) (0.0025) (0.0103) (0.0058) (0.0003) (0.0003) – –
France -0.0040 0.0110* -0.1178* 0.2084* 0.0192* -0.0179* 7.79% 5.96% 0.0255* 0.0197* -0.0764* 0.2044* 0.0151* -0.0212* 5.93% 6.39%
(0.0048) (0.0044) (0.0037) (0.0088) (0.0003) (0.0002) – – (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0117) (0.0139) (0.0002) (0.0004) – –
Germany -0.0100 0.0323* -0.1151* 0.1835* 0.0203* -0.0187* 7.33% 5.96% 0.0238* 0.0222* -0.0616* 0.2813* 0.0147* -0.0228* 6.39% 6.39%
(0.0067) (0.0097) (0.0083) (0.0130) (0.0011) (0.0004) – – (0.0029) (0.0010) (0.0091) (0.0125) (0.0003) (0.0007) – –
Greece -0.0003 0.0358* -0.0396* 0.1264* 0.0167* -0.0174* 6.42% 7.33% 0.0096* 0.0007 -0.1606* 0.1778* 0.0232* -0.0124* 11.41% 4.56%
(0.0051) (0.0101) (0.0094) (0.0122) (0.0007) (0.0004) – – (0.0025) (0.0010) (0.0127) (0.0099) (0.0003) (0.0008) – –
Ireland 0.0165* 0.0276* -0.1036* 0.1725* 0.0192* -0.0187* 5.96% 5.04% 0.0366* 0.0235* -0.0068 0.0850* 0.0172* -0.0130* 9.13% 6.39%
(0.0042) (0.0067) (0.0050) (0.0114) (0.0008) (0.0004) – – (0.0037) (0.0019) (0.0048) (0.0133) (0.0004) (0.0006) – –
Italy 0.0084 0.0069 -0.1594* 0.1763* 0.0189* -0.0181* 6.42% 6.42% 0.0181* 0.0196* -0.0740* 0.0199 0.0114* -0.0120* 4.10% 6.84%
(0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0030) (0.0120) (0.0002) (0.0002) – – (0.0023) (0.0035) (0.0081) (0.0111) (0.0003) (0.0003) – –
Japan 0.0313* 0.2138* 0.4165* 0.4578* 0.0449* -0.0135* 4.12% 4.58% 0.0154* -0.0006 -0.0149 0.3387* 0.0152* -0.0204* 8.21% 6.39%
(0.0148) (0.0192) (0.0262) (0.0285) (0.0008) (0.0009) – – (0.0015) (0.0034) (0.0174) (0.0232) (0.0006) (0.0008) – –
Netherlands 0.0109* 0.0647* -0.0224* 0.0238* 0.0205* -0.0196* 5.96% 6.42% 0.0162* 0.0278* -0.0161* 0.0576* 0.0156* -0.0213* 7.76% 6.84%
(0.0049) (0.0033) (0.0015) (0.0022) (0.0006) (0.0004) – – (0.0023) (0.0010) (0.0067) (0.0046) (0.0003) (0.0005) – –
Norway 0.0405* 0.0939* -0.0311* 0.1227* 0.0170* -0.0131* 4.58% 6.42% -0.0168* 0.0137* 0.0278* 0.1525* 0.0096* -0.0158* 6.39% 4.10%
(0.0038) (0.0063) (0.0076) (0.0072) (0.0003) (0.0002) – – (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0065) (0.0126) (0.0003) (0.0005) – –
Portugal 0.0053 0.0465* -0.0310* 0.0913* 0.0189* -0.0194* 6.42% 7.79% 0.0166* 0.0068* -0.0533* 0.1331* 0.0216* -0.0178* 9.58% 6.39%
(0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0101) (0.0171) (0.0006) (0.0004) – – (0.0032) (0.0018) (0.0156) (0.0109) (0.0005) (0.0008) – –
Spain 0.0060 0.0347* -0.0750 0.1705* 0.0181* -0.0175* 6.42% 8.25% -0.0015 0.0193* -0.0461* 0.0793* 0.0174* -0.0140* 6.84% 6.84%
(0.0053) (0.0075) (0.0057) (0.0135) (0.0006) (0.0005) – – (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0091) (0.0110) (0.0005) (0.0004) – –
United Kingdom -0.0200* 0.0424* -0.0663* 0.1120* 0.0166* -0.0154* 5.50% 4.58% 0.0401* 0.0218* -0.0465* 0.2382* 0.0138* -0.0179* 4.56% 5.02%
(0.0050) (0.0080) (0.0135) (0.0143) (0.0007) (0.0004) – – (0.0031) (0.0018) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0005) (0.0006) – –
United States -0.0372* 0.0685* 0.0114* 0.1413* 0.0247* -0.0199* 4.12% 3.66% 0.0353* 0.0178* -0.1042* 0.1892* 0.0205* -0.0280* 5.93% 7.30%
(0.0081) (0.0046) (0.0133) (0.0199) (0.0006) (0.0009) – – (0.0019) (0.0030) (0.0121) (0.0131) (0.0005) (0.0006) – –
Note: See Table 5.
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Table A3: Sub-sample estimation results with 2 × std(yit) thresholds
Sub-sample: 2001W48 - 2006W14 Sub-sample: 2006W15 - 2010W33
Sample Observed regressors Shift-Contagion Crisis Freq. Observed regressors Shift-Contagion Crisis Freq.
countries gF F Rt−1 g
Y SP
t−1 s
SMI
it−1 yit−1 C
+
it C
−
it Ups. Downs. g
F F R
t−1 g
Y SP
t−1 s
SMI
it−1 yit−1 C
+
it C
−
it Ups. Downs.
Australia -0.0418* 0.0650* -0.0880* 0.0445* 0.0211* -0.0195* 2.83% 1.26% 0.0332* 0.0354* 0.0185* 0.1504* 0.0116* -0.0174* 2.28% 3.20%
(0.0099) (0.0070) (0.0104) (0.0158) (0.0009) (0.0009) – – (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0095) (0.0130) (0.0009) (0.0005) – –
Austria -0.0264* 0.0311* -0.0312* 0.0396* 0.0235* -0.0243* 3.46% 2.52% 0.0007 0.0237* -0.0421* 0.0855* 0.0144* -0.0268* 1.37% 2.28%
(0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0116) (0.0118) (0.0010) (0.0005) – – (0.0033) (0.0025) (0.0083) (0.0183) (0.0009) (0.0012) – –
Belgium -0.0063 0.0120* -0.0672* 0.1082* 0.0213* -0.0250* 3.14% 2.52% 0.0207* 0.0246* -0.0122* 0.0947* 0.0139* -0.0226* 2.28% 2.28%
(0.0070) (0.0055) (0.0089) (0.0122) (0.0006) (0.0005) – – (0.0033) (0.0029) (0.0057) (0.0128) (0.0010) (0.0003) – –
Canada -0.0496* 0.0249* -0.1055* 0.1214* 0.0192* -0.0203* 3.14% 1.89% 0.0397* 0.0109* -0.0116 0.2208* 0.0139* -0.0214* 2.74% 2.28%
(0.0042) (0.0080) (0.0074) (0.0140) (0.0006) (0.0008) – – (0.0047) (0.0029) (0.0082) (0.0162) (0.0008) (0.0009) – –
Czech Republic -0.0508* 0.0789* -0.0970* 0.1076* 0.0176* -0.0176* 2.52% 1.57% -0.0012 0.0247* -0.0951* 0.0708* 0.0071* -0.0075* 3.65% 2.28%
(0.0085) (0.0106) (0.0152) (0.0089) (0.0007) (0.0011) – – (0.0007) (0.0025) (0.0081) (0.0094) (0.0005) (0.0020) – –
Finland -0.0042 0.0173* -0.0285* 0.0775* 0.0230* -0.0258* 3.14% 2.52% 0.0101* 0.0336* -0.0501* 0.0597* 0.0141* -0.0251* 1.83% 4.57%
(0.0059) (0.0062) (0.0045) (0.0087) (0.0009) (0.0002) – – (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0068) (0.0088) (0.0011) (0.0008) – –
France -0.0097 0.0045 -0.0893* 0.1392* 0.0204* -0.0233* 2.20% 2.20% 0.0213* 0.0200* -0.0829* 0.2360* 0.0146* -0.0263* 1.37% 3.65%
(0.0070) (0.0041) (0.0095) (0.0069) (0.0006) (0.0006) – – (0.0041) (0.0032) (0.0109) (0.0144) (0.0006) (0.0005) – –
Germany -0.0047 0.0093 -0.0544* 0.1187* 0.0205* -0.0249* 2.52% 2.52% 0.0307* 0.0202* -0.0667* 0.3036* 0.0144* -0.0296* 1.37% 5.48%
(0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0105) (0.0129) (0.0006) (0.0009) – – (0.0052) (0.0039) (0.0198) (0.0197) (0.0008) (0.0024) – –
Greece 0.0082 0.0392* -0.0404* 0.0242* 0.0192* -0.0206* 3.77% 2.83% -0.0419* -0.0599* -0.4604* -0.2880* 0.0431* -0.0522* 5.02% 0.91%
(0.0061) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0122) (0.0006) (0.0004) – – (0.0060) (0.0085) (0.0187) (0.0260) (0.0014) (0.0013) – –
Ireland 0.0167* 0.0098 -0.1020* 0.1138* 0.0198* -0.0254* 2.83% 1.57% 0.0426* 0.0240* 0.0176* 0.0376* 0.0222* -0.0081* 2.74% 1.37%
(0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0112) (0.0072) (0.0007) (0.0011) – – (0.0037) (0.0025) (0.0070) (0.0131) (0.0012) (0.0012) – –
Italy 0.0024 0.0072* -0.1455 0.1194* 0.0192* -0.0240* 3.77% 1.89% 0.0182* 0.0260* -0.0845* 0.0068* 0.0116* -0.0141* 2.74% 1.37%
(0.0061) (0.0072) (0.0206) (0.0173) (0.0006) (0.0007) – – (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0060) (0.0087) (0.0003) (0.0009) – –
Japan 0.0221* 0.1010* 0.3642* 0.4300* 0.0498* -0.0341* 2.83% 0.31% 0.0109* -0.0052 -0.0254 0.3782* 0.0139* -0.0220* 2.74% 2.28%
(0.0114) (0.0192) (0.0165) (0.0228) (0.0016) (0.0023) – – (0.0014) (0.0054) (0.0142) (0.0211) (0.0008) (0.0008) – –
Netherlands 0.0051 0.0259* -0.0175* 0.0041 0.0226* -0.0273* 2.83% 2.83% 0.0172* 0.0300* -0.0284* 0.0662* 0.0150* -0.0242* 0.91% 4.57%
(0.0078) (0.0049) (0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0008) (0.0008) – – (0.0038) (0.0008) (0.0048) (0.0065) (0.0007) (0.0011) – –
Norway 0.0377* 0.0732* -0.0386* 0.1207* 0.0175* -0.0175* 2.52% 2.52% -0.0191* 0.0139 0.0230* 0.1600* 0.0112* -0.0194* 2.28% 3.20%
(0.0086) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0139) (0.0007) (0.0011) – – (0.0020) (0.0031) (0.0075) (0.0111) (0.0004) (0.0004) – –
Portugal 0.0115 0.0210* 0.0518* 0.0670* 0.0212* -0.0270* 3.77% 2.52% 0.1879* 0.1743* -0.1149* -0.2821* 0.0007* -0.0064* 3.20% 0.91%
(0.0066) (0.0080) (0.0106) (0.0180) (0.0008) (0.0009) – – (0.0072) (0.0031) (0.0099) (0.0074) (0.0007) (0.0010) – –
Spain 0.0096* 0.0207* -0.0407* 0.1260* 0.0184* -0.0239* 3.14% 2.52% 0.0005 0.0193* -0.0698* 0.0463* 0.0195* -0.0176* 1.83% 2.28%
(0.0044) (0.0047) (0.0083) (0.0124) (0.0005) (0.0004) – – (0.0033) (0.0049) (0.0103) (0.0134) (0.0007) (0.0022) – –
United Kingdom -0.0195* 0.0364* -0.0341* 0.0496* 0.0137* -0.0203* 1.89% 1.57% 0.0365* 0.0263* -0.0031 0.1900* 0.0145* -0.0257* 2.28% 2.74%
(0.0041) (0.0086) (0.0110) (0.0186) (0.0005) (0.0005) – – (0.0017) (0.0027) (0.0090) (0.0081) (0.0004) (0.0010) – –
United States -0.0629* 0.0530* 0.0098 0.0918* 0.0277* -0.0281* 3.46% 1.26% 0.0387* 0.0203* -0.1336* 0.1947* 0.0213* -0.0323* 1.83% 3.65%
(0.0074) (0.0126) (0.0092) (0.0303) (0.0009) (0.0015) – – (0.0034) (0.0039) (0.0163) (0.0166) (0.0010) (0.0009) – –
Note: See Table 6.
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Table A4: Sub-sample crisis thresholds
2001W48 - 2006W14 2006W15 - 2010W33
Sample Estimated thresholds
countries τˆEV T+i τˆ
EV T−
i τˆ
2std
i τˆ
EV T+
i τˆ
EV T−
i τˆ
2std
i
Australia 0.0319 0.0287 0.0382 0.0429 0.0414 0.0402
Austria 0.0319 0.0287 0.0337 0.0429 0.0414 0.0430
Belgium 0.0278 0.0318 0.0328 0.0356 0.0386 0.0397
Canada 0.0306 0.0304 0.0347 0.0500 0.0364 0.0476
Czech Republic 0.0396 0.0429 0.0423 0.0367 0.0489 0.0491
Finland 0.0401 0.0312 0.0341 0.0337 0.0488 0.0420
France 0.0355 0.0319 0.0330 0.0381 0.0412 0.0407
Germany 0.0370 0.0301 0.0331 0.0421 0.0576 0.0483
Greece 0.0371 0.0270 0.0313 0.1213 0.0307 0.0701
Ireland 0.0329 0.0333 0.0335 0.0463 0.0278 0.0561
Italy 0.0328 0.0336 0.0321 0.0326 0.0235 0.0345
Japan 0.1025 0.0863 0.1059 0.0473 0.0552 0.0579
Netherlands 0.0402 0.0294 0.0335 0.0354 0.0459 0.0421
Norway 0.0358 0.0320 0.0343 0.0335 0.0470 0.0416
Portugal 0.0315 0.0302 0.0331 0.0431 0.0404 0.0548
Spain 0.0363 0.0308 0.0326 0.0357 0.0368 0.0413
United Kingdom 0.0211 0.0327 0.0316 0.0476 0.0636 0.0530
United States 0.0513 0.0429 0.0481 0.0564 0.0830 0.0688
Note: See Table 2.
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